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How America’s Newest Consumer Credit Statute Fails to 
Protect Its Oldest Consumers:  A Critique of the Credit 
CARD Act of 2009* 
 
I. Introduction 
Facing off against a number of credit card industry executives before the 
United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
on January 25, 2007, Harvard Law Professor and consumer advocate 
Elizabeth Warren1 made her position unmistakably clear:  “The credit card 
market is broken.”2  Professor Warren’s comprehensive testimony included 
sharp criticism of credit card marketing practices which target the elderly, 
who “have the dark distinction of being the fastest growing age group filing 
for bankruptcy.”3  She concluded by urging the Senate to enact Senator 
Christopher Dodd’s Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and 
Disclosure (Credit CARD) Act as “an important first step to reign in 
abusive lending practices.”4  In so doing, Professor Warren lent her voice to 
a growing chorus of legal commentators arguing in favor of enhanced 
statutory protections for elderly credit card consumers.5 
                                                                                                                 
 * The author wishes to thank Professor Brian McCall for his helpful comments and 
advice.  This comment is dedicated to my wife, Carmen, whose patience and 
encouragement was an essential part of the writing process.  This comment is also dedicated 
to Catheryn Koss and Jill Watskey of the Senior Law Resource Center in Oklahoma 
City.  Their generous support of my interest in legal issues facing the elderly is deeply 
appreciated. 
 1. President Obama later appointed Elizabeth Warren, a native of Oklahoma, as Assistant 
to the President and Special Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury to assist in launching the 
newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, a Department of Treasury agency which 
will implement the Credit CARD Act of 2009 and other consumer financial protection statutes.  
See Meet Elizabeth Warren, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumer 
finance.gov/the-bureau/meet-Elizabeth-Warren (last visited Feb. 13, 2011). 
 2. Examining the Billing, Marketing, and Disclosure Practices of the Credit Card 
Industry, & Their Impact on Consumers:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & 
Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 1-2 (2007) [hereinafter Warren Testimony] (statement of Elizabeth 
Warren, Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law, Harvard Law School). 
 3. Id. at 6. 
 4. Id. at 7. 
 5. See, e.g., Donna S. Harkness, When Over-the-Limit Is Over the Top:  Addressing the 
Adverse Impact of Unconscionable Consumer-Credit Practices on the Elderly, 16 ELDER L.J. 
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Following “a long process of negotiations between consumer groups, 
credit card companies, elected officials, regulators, and other interested 
parties,” Congress enacted the Credit CARD Act in 2009.6  Although the 
Credit CARD Act was signed by President Obama on May 22, 2009, the 
final regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act were not effective until 
August 2010.7  In addition, the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
which will enforce the provisions of the Credit Card Act, was not fully 
operational until summer 2011.8  As a result, the Credit CARD Act’s effects 
are only beginning to be felt.  Nevertheless, some elder consumer credit 
reform advocates already accord it high praise.9  Others are more cautious, 
stressing that the Act is “not a panacea,” but expressing hope that it “does 
provide welcome relief as it portends a new, more consumer oriented 
direction for the credit card industry.”10 
In the years leading up to the passage of the Credit CARD Act, consumer 
credit reform advocates presented increasingly persuasive and alarming 
evidence that the elderly represent a uniquely vulnerable class of credit card 
consumers who face constant bombardment from a greedy industry focused 
almost exclusively on profit-maximization.11  To the extent that this 
assessment is accurate, it is worth examining whether the Credit CARD Act 
sufficiently protects elderly credit card consumers from predatory lending. 
                                                                                                                 
1, 22 (2008) (arguing that existing consumer credit protections “should again be revised to add 
substantive protections to address the abuses currently rampant in the area of open-ended 
credit”); Deanne Loonin & Elizabeth Renuart, The Life and Debt Cycle:  The Growing Debt 
Burdens of Older Consumers and Related Policy Recommendations, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
167, 190-93 (2007) (presenting “seven principles” that purport to provide guidance to 
legislators when drafting consumer credit reform statutes for the elderly). 
 6. Stanton Koppel, Nicole Ibbotson, & Helen Y. Lee, Credit CARD Act of 2009:  
Implementation Guidelines, 63 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 205, 206 (2009). 
 7. Donna S. Harkness, The Credit CARD Act of 2009:  Welcome Relief or Too Little, Too 
Late for Vulnerable Seniors?, BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., Sept. 2010, at 12, 12. 
 8. See Learn About the Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www. 
consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau (last visited Feb. 13, 2011). 
 9. See Harkness, supra note 7, at 12 (noting enthusiastic AARP approval of the Credit 
CARD Act). 
 10. Id. at 20 (expressing the author’s own view). 
 11. See, e.g., HEATHER C. MCGHEE & TAMARA DRAUT, DĒMOS, RETIRING IN THE RED:  
THE GROWTH OF DEBT AMONG OLDER AMERICANS 1-7 (2004), available at http://archive. 
demos.org/pubs/retiring_2ed.pdf; Loonin & Renuart, supra note 5, at 168-89; Nathalie Martin, 
Consumer Scams and the Elderly:  Preserving Independence Through Shifting Default Rules, 
17 ELDER L.J. 1, 1-4 (2009); Jeffrey Kimball Paulsen, Note, Credit Card Disclosures and the 
Elderly:  Will the Proposed Amendments to Regulation Z Help the Elderly Understand Credit 
Card Documents?, 17 ELDER L.J. 125, 126-34 (2009). 
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Unfortunately, it does not.  While the Credit CARD Act is a step in the 
right direction, it ultimately fails to provide adequate consumer protection 
to elderly credit card consumers and may actually do more harm than good.  
Thus, the passage of the Credit CARD Act will not end the victimization of 
elderly credit card users by unscrupulous lenders.  To the contrary, elderly 
credit card consumers will not have the substantive statutory protections 
they deserve until Congress enacts an elder-specific consumer credit 
protection statute.   
Part II of this comment reviews and reaffirms the position of consumer 
credit reform advocates regarding the vulnerabilities of elderly credit card 
consumers, the predatory lending practices prevalent in the credit card 
industry, and the nexus between the two.  Part III traces the historical 
legislative and regulatory response to abusive lending practices.  Part IV 
summarizes the substantive protections that the Credit CARD Act provides.  
Part V explains why these provisions, while helpful to a limited extent, 
ultimately fail to protect elderly credit card consumers and may actually 
harm them.  Part VI proposes substantive statutory consumer protections 
for elderly credit card consumers and also offers some suggestions for 
obtaining the best protection for elderly credit card consumers under 
existing law. 
II. Credit Cards and the Elderly:  A Tale of Use and Abuse 
Credit card use among the elderly is on the rise in the United States.12  
Approximately 75% of the elderly are credit card consumers.13  The 
average amount of credit card debt for elderly consumers represents about 
20% of the average income for the elderly.14  The elderly experienced the 
largest growth in credit card debt of any age group in the years between 
1989 and 2004.15  These troubling statistics prompt a number of questions.  
What unique factors are causing elderly had credit card consumers to 
acquire ever-increasing amounts of credit card debt?  How is the credit card 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See Loonin & Renuart, supra note 5, at 168 (“Average credit card debt for Americans 
between the ages of sixty-five and sixty-nine rose a staggering 217% between 1992 and 2001, 
to $5,844.”). 
 13. See MCGHEE & DRAUT, supra note 11, at 2. 
 14. See Paulsen, supra note 11, at 128 (citing statistics that indicate that in 2001, credit 
card consumers over the age of sixty-five had an average credit card indebtedness of $4041 and 
an average annual income of $18,938 (21% ratio) and that credit card consumers aged 65-69 
had an average credit card indebtedness of $5844 and an average annual income of $26,796 
(22% ratio)). 
 15. Id. 
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industry persuading elderly credit card consumers to take on more debt?  In 
the end, has the net result of increased credit card use by the elderly had 
positive or negative effects on society?   
The personal experience of each elderly credit card consumer is surely 
unique.  Nonetheless, an examination of several factors and trends unique 
to elderly credit card consumers the helps to illuminate the problematic 
relationship between this segment of the population and the credit card 
industry.16 
A. A Portrait of an Elderly Credit Card Consumer 
Today’s elderly credit card consumer is retired or nearing retirement.17  
As such, he or she confronts a number of difficult economic challenges.  An 
increasing number of elderly persons rely on Social Security as their sole 
source of retirement income.18  The recent economic downturn has made an 
already difficult situation even worse as the value of retirement investments 
continues to decline.19  Meanwhile, housing costs (including property 
taxes), medical expenses, and energy prices continue to rise.20  In short, 
today’s elderly person faces “declining income and wealth coupled with 
rising costs.”21  One possible bright spot in an otherwise bleak financial 
picture is home ownership:  “Many older Americans . . . have a great deal 
                                                                                                                 
 16. The argument no doubt will be made that the Credit CARD Act significantly 
ameliorates many of the problems inherent in elderly credit card use that are depicted in this 
section.  Nonetheless, an accurate presentation of the status quo in the years directly preceding 
the passage of the Credit CARD Act provides an essential starting point for an analysis of its 
likely effectiveness.  Unfortunately, the Credit CARD Act is demonstrably ineffective at 
solving the myriad problems surrounding credit card use by the elderly. 
 17. Defining “elderly” with respect to a specific age is a complex matter.  Nonetheless, the 
simple fact of Social Security eligibility age brackets causes most older Americans to make the 
shift from full-time employment to retirement sometime during their sixties.  See SSA Federal 
Old-Age, Survivors & Disability Insurance, 20 C.F.R. § 404.409 (2010) (“Full retirement age 
has been 65 but is being gradually raised to age 67 beginning with people born after January 1, 
1938.”).  Given that retirement tends to be the most significant factor of economic change in 
the lives of most older Americans, it functions as a useful proxy for drawing a precise line 
between “elderly” and “non-elderly.”  Indeed, credit card use appears to spike significantly 
after the age of sixty-five.  See Paulsen, supra note 11, at 128 (citing statistics that indicate that 
in 2001-2002, the average credit card indebtedness of individuals aged 55-64 was $4088, while 
the average credit card indebtedness of individuals aged 65-69 was $5844, a difference of 
$1756). 
 18. See Loonin & Renuart, supra note 5, at 170-71. 
 19. See Harkness, supra note 7, at 12 (noting that “senior citizens . . . have found 
themselves increasingly strapped for cash during the current economic downturn”). 
 20. Loonin & Renuart, supra note 5, at 171-73. 
 21. Paulsen, supra note 11, at 129. 
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of equity in their homes, but not much else.”22  Thus, the home has become 
the “primary asset of many retirees.”23  Home equity is an illiquid asset, 
however, with no immediate financial use to an elderly person except as 
collateral for a mortgage or other type of debt.24 
Elderly credit card consumers frequently face physical and mental 
challenges which render them more vulnerable than the general population 
to various forms of financial abuse.25  Indeed, “vulnerability to abuse can be 
due to cognitive impairment, physical impairments, sensory impairments, 
or socioemotional vulnerabilities” or any combination of these.26  
Physically, elderly persons often spend a majority of their time at home due 
to lack of mobility, rending them vulnerable to aggressive and enticing 
sales pitches via phone, mail, and direct solicitation.27  Meanwhile, 
neurological research indicates that “older people have difficulty in 
processing new information” and “retain less detail about the information 
they do process . . . .”28 
Socio-culturally, the elderly credit card consumer tends to have “old-
fashioned” values that may conflict with modern-day business practices: 
[T]he generation that is currently aged sixty-five to eighty-four 
was either born or came of age during World War II.  This 
generation is known for individuals that are both trusting and 
trustworthy; they value promises and consider one’s word to be 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Martin, supra note 11, at 20. 
 23. Id. at 21 (praising California for providing a greater homestead exemption to “people 
over age sixty-five”). 
 24. See id. at 22-25 (suggesting that a reverse mortgage can be a useful solution for an 
elderly person seeking to “discharge a great deal of debt”).  The reverse mortgage should 
probably best be regarded as an extreme option of last resort due to its high long-term costs and 
consequences, including its limited usefulness (it can only be used once) and the negative 
effects it has on inheritance.  See id. at 24.  Attorneys and their clients should approach the 
reverse mortgage option with caution.  But see Celeste M. Hammond, Reverse Mortgages:  A 
Financial Planning Device for the Elderly, 1 ELDER L.J. 75, 76-77 (1993) (arguing that reverse 
mortgages are a desirable tool that should be widely used). 
 25. Shelby A.D. Moore & Jeanette Schaefer, Remembering the Forgotten Ones:  
Protecting the Elderly from Financial Abuse, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 505, 517-20 (2004) 
(noting that “senior citizens living independently . . . are especially vulnerable to financial 
abuse”). 
 26. Id. at 518. 
 27. See id. at 518 n.50 (referencing Senator Tom Daschle’s statement, and noting that “the 
elderly are frequently targeted by criminals because they lack mobility, they are isolated, and 
they are dependent on others”). 
 28. Harkness, supra note 5, at 19. 
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one’s bond. . . . [T]his generation tends to be loath to leave any 
obligation they have incurred unmet.29 
In addition, elderly credit card consumers are frequently lonely and as a 
result are more willing to let their guard down—approaching interpersonal 
interactions with less healthy suspicion than they might once have done.30 
Educationally, elderly persons are overall less literate than other age 
groups:  in a 2003 study “adults ages 65 and older had the lowest average 
prose, document, and quantitative literacy.”31  Prose literacy involves “[t]he 
knowledge and skills needed to search, comprehend, and use information 
from continuous texts,” such as a newspaper article.32  Document literacy 
involves the same ability with respect to non-continuous texts, such as a 
schedule.33  Quantitative literacy involves “[t]he knowledge and skills 
needed to identify and perform computations using numbers that are 
embedded in printed materials,” such as a credit card statement.34  While 
the percentage of elderly persons aged sixty-five and older who had “Below 
Basic” literacy declined from 33% in 1992 to 23% in 2003, elderly persons 
still had almost double the rate of “Below Basic” literacy compared to any 
other age group.35 
B. Offers of Credit and Acceptance by the Elderly 
Credit card companies aggressively target offers of credit to individuals 
of all ages, including over six billion “pre-approved” credit offers alone.36  
This seemingly equal-opportunity marketing strategy obscures the credit 
card industry’s “two-tier business model,” under which credit card 
companies categorize their customers in terms of regular payers and non-
regular payers.37  Regarding the first tier: 
For each of these [regularly-paying] customers, the card issuer 
can count on a stream of revenue—money from the merchants 
each time the customer used the credit card [known as 
interchange fees], annual fees from some of the customers, and a 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Id. at 3-4. 
 30. See Martin, supra note 11, at 4-5. 
 31. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., LITERACY IN EVERYDAY LIFE:  RESULTS FROM THE 2003 
NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF ADULT LITERACY 27 (2003). 
 32. Id. at iii. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 28. 
 36. Warren Testimony, supra note 2, at 3. 
 37. Id. 
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chance to sell enhancements, such as credit insurance and tax 
preparation assistance.  It is a profitable business.38 
Indeed, in 2005, interchange fees, annual fees, and enhancements 
generated a total of nearly $25 billion in revenue for credit card 
companies.39 
But the latter category of “second tier” customers is even more valuable.  
In addition to contributing their share of the $25 billion of “first tier” 
revenues: 
[T]he customers who generate the real profits for the credit card 
companies are those who stumble and slide, who make payments 
and miss payments, and who end up paying default rates of 
interest and penalty fees.  To maximize profits from this group, 
the credit card issuers have a second tier to their business model:  
they load their initial card agreements with tricks and traps so 
that they can maximize income from interest rates and fees.40 
Again, in 2005, interest rates and penalty fees generated nearly $80 
billion in revenue for credit card companies.41  In other words, “[n]early 
eight out of every ten dollars of revenue comes from the customers who 
cannot pay off their bills in full every month.”42 
A typical offer of credit contains one or more “bait and switch” terms 
and conditions, such as “teaser rates” and “deferred interest.”43  Prior to the 
passage of the Credit CARD Act, terms and conditions like these were fully 
legal, no matter how “egregiously unfair,” as long as required pre-lending 
disclosures had been made.44  Shifting interest rates and surprise fees 
associated with carefully-crafted credit cards enable credit card companies 
to market offers which simultaneously entice and baffle consumers.45  
Sadly, “[a]fter experiencing the tricks and traps of these forms of credit, 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Id. 
 39. See id. at 2. 
 40. Id. at 2-3. 
 41. See id. at 2. 
 42. Id.  Only time will tell what effect, if any, the Credit CARD Act will have on this ratio. 
 43. Martin, supra note 11, at 12. 
 44. Harkness, supra note 5, at 9.  Note that the Credit CARD Act has limited, but has not 
eliminated, these practices. 
 45. See Martin, supra note 11, at 8-11 (citing behavioral research that suggests that 
optimism regarding ability to pay is widespread among financial consumers and creates 
vulnerability to highly-enticing offers). 
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younger individuals have time to get back on their feet, but the elderly have 
no such luxury.”46 
Credit card companies are well aware of the unique vulnerabilities of 
various classes of credit card users, including elderly credit card users.  For 
example, one Bank of America executive admitted that “last year the bank 
had conducted more than 500 experiments and sent out 111 million pieces 
of mail to test consumer behavior with credit cards.”47  Unfortunately for 
the elderly consumer, “[t]here is a darker side to these data than mere profit 
maximization.  Creditors are well aware of the numerous errors of cognition 
committed by consumers and capitalize on the errors in order to increase 
bottom lines.”48 
No great inferential leap is required to perceive a nexus between (1) the 
unique financial, physical, mental, and cultural vulnerabilities of the 
elderly, (2) hyper-aggressive credit card lending practices, and (3) increased 
credit card debt by the elderly: 
[T]he world of marketing, advertising, and financial product 
design is changing so rapidly that it is hard for anyone to keep 
up.  For the elderly, the fastest growing demographic in 
America, it is particularly difficult to cope.  Many of the 
products being offered to consumers today simply were not 
available a decade ago, when many older clients were full 
participants in the economy.49 
Thus, it is little wonder that the elderly credit card consumer, squeezed 
by financial need on the one hand and enticed by the false promise of easy 
and low-cost credit on the other, turns to credit card use without full 
awareness of the potential consequences. 
C. Results of Credit Card Use by the Elderly 
Credit card use by the elderly does not have to be harmful.  Indeed, 
credit card use can prove beneficial for the elderly, but only to a limited 
extent.  Credit cards can provide needed liquidity for an elderly individual 
on a fixed income because that person can use the card when everyday 
purchases need to be made or bills need to be paid and then pay off the 
card’s monthly balance when Social Security and other funds become 
available.  Credit cards can also function as a helpful “safety net” for 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Id. at 9. 
 47. Id. at 11 (referencing remarks by Elizabeth Warren). 
 48. Id. at 12. 
 49. Id. at 2. 
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emergency purchases such as minor medical expenses or home and 
automobile repairs.50  Of course, should an elderly person use their credit 
card for the former purpose, then the “safety net” potential of that card is 
reduced, increasing the temptation to take out yet another credit card for 
“emergencies.” 
Unfortunately, credit card use by the elderly can easily result in 
astronomically mounting debt with little or no ability to pay it down.  For 
example, the Ohio case of Discover Bank v. Owens involved an elderly 
consumer who charged less than $2000 on her credit card and yet was sued 
for $5564.28 of debt, in spite of having made payments totaling $3492 over 
the course of six years.51  While cases such as this are admittedly anecdotal, 
the mathematical nature of interest charges and fees strongly implies that 
elderly persons in similar situations are certain to face similar results.52  
Living on a fixed income only exacerbates the problem of mounting finance 
charges because payment due dates may not coincide with benefit 
payments, thus causing the elderly credit card consumer to fall further 
behind.53 
Credit card debt can have negative consequences for anyone, but the 
consequences for elderly credit card consumers are often severe.  
Indebtedness can have immediate consequences to an elderly person 
because of creditor garnishment laws, which permit creditors to garnish the 
                                                                                                                 
 50. See Paulsen, supra note 11, at 129.  But see Harkness, supra note 5, at 20-21 
(acknowledging the “safety net” potential of credit cards, but arguing that going into debt at a 
time of emergency is ultimately a harmful choice). 
 51. 822 N.E.2d 869, 872 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. 2004).  Ms. Owens, who represented herself 
pro se, received a judgment in her favor after the judge held that Discover Bank’s actions had 
been “unreasonable, unconscionable, and unjust.”  Id. at 875. 
 52. See Warren Testimony, supra note 2, at 5-6 (referencing several more cases with 
similar facts).  But see Harkness, supra note 7, at 18-20 (arguing that under the Credit CARD 
Act, elderly credit card consumers in similar situations might endure less severe consequences, 
but admitting that they would suffer significant consequences nonetheless). 
 53. See Discover Bank, 822 N.E.2d at 871-72.  Ms. Owens’s answer to Discover Bank’s 
complaint stated the following:   
I would like to inform you that I have no money to make payments.  I am on 
Social Security Disability.  After paying my monthly utilities, there is no money 
left . . . and sometimes it isn’t enough.  If my situation was different I would pay.  
I just don’t have it.  I’m sorry.  
Id. at 871.  Recall that Ms. Owens had already tendered $3492 in payments; however, “[s]ince 
many of the payments were below the minimum monthly payment required and because other 
monthly payments were in fact not timely made, Owens further was assessed numerous late-
payment fees, which over the six-year period totaled $1,160.”  Id. at 872. 
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bank accounts of debtors.54  Although Social Security and certain other 
exempt funds cannot be lawfully garnished, banks frequently freeze 
accounts containing these funds when presented with a garnishment order 
because of the difficulty of distinguishing between exempt and non-exempt 
funds.55  The impact that this practice has on elderly persons living on fixed 
incomes is easy to imagine:  “Social Security recipients whose bank 
accounts are frozen often experience major difficulties during the weeks or 
even months it may take to prove their funds are exempt and regain access 
to the federal benefits they rely upon for subsistence.”56 
Unfortunately, bankruptcy is increasingly becoming the only way out for 
elderly persons struggling with credit cards and other forms of debt.  In 
2001, Americans aged sixty-five and older increased their bankruptcy 
filings by 213%, “the largest rate growth within any age group.”57  And in 
2008, a follow-up study showed that “a much larger fraction of the people 
filing for bankruptcy in 2007 were retirement age or older than in 1991.”58  
Even worse, “since 1991, the bankruptcy risk for older Americans has 
increased substantially.”59  While credit card debt is certainly not the only 
cause of increased bankruptcy filings, its prevalence among the elderly is 
certainly a contributing factor. 
III. Legislative and Regulatory Responses to Abusive Lending Practices 
No federal consumer credit protection statutes or regulations provide 
explicit provisions targeting the specific needs of elderly credit card users.  
Prior to the passage of the Credit CARD Act, federal regulation of credit 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Paula Burkes, New Rules May Guard Seniors’ Benefits, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 15, 
2010, at 1C. 
 55. See John Infranca, Safer than the Mattress?  Protecting Social Security Benefits from 
Bank Freezes and Garnishments, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1127, 1129 (2010).  Banks “risk 
incurring liability for the full amount” of a garnishment order if they refuse to garnish non-
exempt funds.  Burkes, supra note 54, at 6C.  Thus, “[w]hen funds from more than one source 
[including Social Security] are combined in one account, it is impossible for a bank to know 
what funds . . . are exempt from being garnished” and banks invariably err on the side of 
caution and freeze the entire account.  Id. 
 56. Infranca, supra note 55, at 1130. 
 57. Teresa A. Sullivan, Deborah Thorne, & Elizabeth Warren, Young, Old, and In 
Between:  Who Files for Bankruptcy?, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Sept. 2001, at 1, 2 (issue 
no. 9A). 
 58. Teresa Sullivan, Deborah Thorne, & Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Ages, NORTON 
BANKR. L. ADVISER, Nov. 2008, at 1, 3 (issue no 11). 
 59. Id. at 4.  The authors concluded that “the economic news for seniors is unambiguously 
grim.”  Id. 
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card lending practices consisted of the Truth-In-Lending Act of 1968 
(TILA)60 and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ Regulation Z, which 
implemented TILA’s provisions.61  Neither of these contained any age-
specific regulations.  However, a brief historical analysis is helpful in 
understanding the foundation on which the Credit CARD Act rests and in 
providing a starting point for new reform proposals. 
It is important to note that federal law preempts state law in this area for 
essentially all purposes because of two Supreme Court decisions which 
almost entirely stripped states of the ability to regulate the lending 
industry.62  In Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha 
Service Corp., the Court held that “[s]ection 85 [of the National Bank 
Act] . . . plainly provides that a national bank may charge interest ‘on any 
loan’ at the rate allowed by the laws of the State in which the bank is 
‘located.’”63  This holding, labeled by some commentators as the 
“exportation doctrine,”64 had the effect of “set[ting] off two races:  first for 
credit card lenders to move their operations to states with no interest rate 
caps, and second for legislatures to remove their usury laws in order to 
attract or hold onto rapidly expanding credit card companies.”65  Later, in 
Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., the Court upheld the Comptroller 
of the Currency’s decision to define “interest” to include penalty fees, thus 
curtailing states’ abilities to regulate fees as well.66  Having thereby limited 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667(e) (West, 
Westlaw through 2011)). 
 61. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2010). 
 62. While the Supreme Court decisions presented here render it nearly impossible for 
states to impose direct regulations on lending institutions which are not located within their 
borders, oversight of abusive lending practices is still possible to a limited extent through 
application of traditional contract doctrines such as unconscionability.  See, e.g., Discover Bank 
v. Owens, 822 N.E.2d 869, 875 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. 2004); Harkness, supra note 5, at 14-15 
(cautioning that “the unconscionability doctrine tends to be reserved for the harshest and 
severest terms and cannot be relied upon to protect vulnerable consumers who are victimized to 
a lesser extent”); see also infra Part VI.C. 
 63. 439 U.S. 299, 308 (1978). 
 64. Loonin & Renuart, supra note 5, at 174 (defining the “exportation doctrine” as a rule 
allowing “banks to locate in a state with no usury caps and few consumer protections and make 
loans to borrowers beyond its borders under the legal regime of the home state . . . thus, 
effectively federaliz[ing] the absence of usury protections in the few states . . . that were willing 
to completely deregulate”). 
 65. Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer Credit:  The 
Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807, 873 (2003). 
 66. 517 U.S. 735, 740-47 (1996). 
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most aspects of lending regulation, the Court left states that do not host 
major banks with few tools to regulate consumer credit. 
A. The Truth-in-Lending Act of 1968 
By 1968, Congress had grown concerned that consumers were not 
adequately informed regarding the range of terms and conditions being 
offered by lenders, including credit card companies.67  Lenders were 
exploiting this weakness by using confusing offers of credit to trap unwary 
consumers under unmanageable amounts of debt.68  After eight years of 
debate, the Senate Banking Committee approved the Truth-in-Lending Act, 
which was quickly passed by the Senate and the House.69  TILA mandated 
the “disclosure of the cost of credit based on standard uniform requirements 
set out by the act and by the Federal Reserve Board.”70  By design, TILA 
regulated much in the way of disclosure, but little in the way of substance.71 
TILA, as initially enacted, quickly became the subject of criticism.72  
After a mere twelve years, its disclosure requirements had engendered a 
complex body of regulatory law which required nearly “1500 advisory 
opinions interpreting what the rules meant.”73  Complaints came from the 
industry and its lobbyists, academic analysts, and even the Governor of the 
Federal Reserve Board himself, who suggested that if TILA was so 
challenging for experts to parse, it could hardly be expected to promote 
clarity in consumer decision-making.74  Thus, in 1980, Congress passed the 
Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act,75 which streamlined a 
number of disclosure requirements and, more significantly for the lending 
industry, eliminated some of TILA’s more stringent penalties.76  Consumer 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Paulsen, supra note 11, at 134. 
 68. See Peterson, supra note 65, at 876. 
 69. Id. at 879.  The full bill was formally termed the “Consumer Credit Protection Act,” 
but the “Truth in Lending” label was the popular name at the time and has persisted to this day.  
See id. 
 70. Id. at 880. 
 71. See id. at 881. 
 72. See id. at 886-90. 
 73. Id. at 886. 
 74. Id. at 888. 
 75. Pub. L. No. 96-221, tit. VI, 94 Stat. 168 (1980).  “The Truth in Lending Simplification 
and Reform Act was passed as part of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act which preempted state interest rate caps on first mortgage home loans.”  Peterson, 
supra note 65, at 889 n.623. 
 76. See Peterson, supra note 65, at 889 (noting that the changes to TILA were so 
significant that the Federal Reserve Board of Governors termed the 1980 revisions as a “new” 
TILA). 
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lawsuits, which had been both frequent and successful under the original 
TILA, stopped almost immediately.77 
B. Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ Regulation Z 
Regulation Z is “issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve system to implement the federal Truth in Lending Act . . . .”78  The 
stated purpose of the regulation is “to promote the informed use of 
consumer credit by requiring disclosures about its terms and costs.”79  The 
regulation “divides the world of credit into two parts:  open-end credit and 
closed-end credit.”80  Credit cards are classified as open-end credit, which is 
covered in Subpart B of Regulation Z.81  Significantly, “Regulation Z 
imposes different disclosure requirements for open-end plans and for closed 
end-plans [which primarily include secured loans, such as home 
mortgages].  Those for the former are less strict than those for the latter.”82 
Although its structure remains the same, Regulation Z was thoroughly 
overhauled in the Credit CARD Act of 2009, so a detailed presentation of 
the specifics of the original Regulation Z is not useful here.83  In 2004, the 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors proposed amending Regulation Z for 
the first time since 1981, beginning with its provisions governing open-
ended credit accounts.84  While the proposed changes were sweeping in 
scope, affecting “all stages of the creditor-consumer relationship,” they 
were nonetheless limited by TILA’s sole emphasis on disclosure and 
included no new substantive regulations.85  In 2005, passage of the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act prompted the 
Board to consider another round of amendments on top of those already 
under consideration.86  After much testing and input from a wide array of 
groups, which notably did not include any groups representing the specific 
interests of elderly credit card consumers,87 the Board promulgated its 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Id. at 890. 
 78. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(a) (2010). 
 79. Id. § 226.1(b). 
 80. Paulsen, supra note 11, at 135. 
 81. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(d)(2). 
 82. Paulsen, supra note 11, at 135-36. 
 83. See Mary Beth Matthews, The Credit CARD Act of 2009 — What Is It, and What Does 
It Do?, 2010 ARK. L. NOTES 65, 65 n.4 (referencing the hundreds of pages of revisions to 
Regulation Z which were promulgated after the passage of the Credit CARD Act). 
 84. Paulsen, supra note 11, at 139. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 140. 
 87. See id. at 145-46 (noting that “only two of the participants in the Board’s consumer 
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revisions in January 2009.88  Given that “[e]ach of these January 2009 
Revisions contains provisions that are affected by the Credit CARD Act,” a 
detailed discussion of these revisions would be superfluous here.89 
C. Praise and Criticism of the Truth-in-Lending Act and Regulation Z 
Any proposed reform or revision to existing consumer credit protection 
law begs the question of why the existing law is inadequate.  Legal 
historian Christopher Peterson argues that TILA’s emphasis on disclosure 
to the exclusion of other substantive regulations has proven “unusually 
attractive in the American political climate.”90  Conservatives support 
disclosure requirements because they are “directed at fixing a breakdown in 
the private decision-making process which guides markets to optimal 
outcomes.”91  Liberals, on the other hand, support disclosure regulations 
because they “provide consumers with an important opportunity to protect 
themselves from credit bargains that are not truly in their own best 
interests.”92  Even the lending industry, “rarely welcoming government 
oversight, has still come to a grudging acceptance of TILA.”93  In short, 
TILA was well-received by many in spite of its flaws. 
Nevertheless, consumer credit reform advocates came to view TILA and 
Regulation Z as hopelessly inadequate to protect consumers.  In her 2007 
Senate testimony, consumer advocate Elizabeth Warren alleged that under 
the existing law, “credit card agreements are incomprehensible.”94  And the 
problem has only worsened under the TILA regime:  “in the early 1980s, 
the typical credit card contract was a page long.  But by the early 2000s, 
that contract had grown to more than 30 pages of incomprehensible text.”95  
                                                                                                                 
research were over the age of sixty, and those two only participated in a single, early-stage 
focus group”).  Interestingly, the AARP does not appears to have lobbied for greater 
involvement for the elderly in the Board’s consumer research.  Perhaps this should come as no 
surprise, given that the front page of the AARP website frequently features a prominent 
advertisement for an AARP-Chase credit card.  See AARP, http://www.AARP.org (last visited 
Jan. 18, 2011). 
 88. Koppel et al., supra note 6, at 206. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Peterson, supra note 65, at 881. 
 91. Id. at 883. 
 92. Id. at 884.  Peterson notes that political liberals “hope for additional regulations that 
more completely clamp down on high-cost lending,” but that they approve of disclosure 
regulations as “at least a palatably good start.”  Id. 
 93. Id. at 881 (“In particular, high-cost creditors have advocated disclosure rules to deflect 
legislative pressure for more substantive rules.”). 
 94. Warren Testimony, supra note 2, at 1. 
 95. Id. at 4. 
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Christopher Peterson, who has an overall favorable view of TILA, still 
admitted that: 
[T]o date, Truth in Lending has not lived up to its potential.  The 
challenge for consumer advocates is to rhetorically recapture 
disclosure law from industry lobbyists.  To do so, consumer 
advocates must recast the goal of disclosure law as aiming not 
merely to truthfully describe contracts, but as aiming to create 
practical contractual understanding on the part of vulnerable 
debtors.  Anything less risks wasting the historically unique 
opportunity of credit disclosure law as yet another demobilizing 
illusion of debtor protection.96 
TILA’s inadequacies raised even more alarm among consumer credit 
protection advocates who focused on the unique vulnerabilities of elderly 
credit card consumers.  For example, recognizing that revising TILA to add 
substantive consumer protections for all might be an uphill political battle, 
one commentator even suggested limiting additional protections “only to 
those aged sixty or over.”97  But whether their proposals were for elder-
specific rules or protections for all, the efforts of consumer credit reform 
advocates eventually began to catch the attention of Congress. 
IV. Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and Disclosure Act of 2009 
While the Federal Reserve Board of Governors was undertaking its 
multi-year revision of Regulation Z’s open-end credit rules, legislative 
efforts to enact substantive credit card reform began percolating through 
Congress.98  These legislative efforts, spearheaded by Senator Christopher 
Dodd and his colleagues on the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, culminated in the passage of the Credit CARD Act of 
2009, which was signed into law by President Obama on May 22, 2009.99  
The Act has been praised as “provid[ing] more clarity” than the January 
2009 Revisions promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.100 
The Act strengthens disclosure requirements across the board and, for the 
first time, adds a number of substantive protections for credit card 
consumers.  What follows is a summary of those provisions which seem 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Peterson, supra note 65, at 903. 
 97. Harkness, supra note 5, at 23. 
 98. Koppel et al., supra note 6, at 205-06. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 206. 
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most likely to impact, for better or worse, elderly credit card consumers.101  
These provisions may be broken down into the following six categories:  
changes in terms, finance charges, payments and due dates, ability to pay, 
enhanced disclosures, and special protections for targeted groups.  Where 
appropriate, new Regulation Z rules will also be summarized. 
A. Changes in Terms 
The overarching goal of changes in terms regulations is to prevent 
surprise changes that affect the cost of credit, whether those changes are 
made to existing accounts or spring up as a result of a “bait and switch” 
offer of new credit.  The Credit CARD Act requires that all interest rate 
increases (which are permitted, subject to some regulation) and all 
“significant changes” be preceded by forty-five days of notice, which 
includes the right to close the account before the changes go into effect.102  
The Federal Reserve Board of Governors is tasked with defining 
“significant changes” and has adopted a broad definition.103  With a few 
exceptions, changes in terms cannot be applied retroactively to any 
outstanding balance.104  If an interest rate is increased due to the “credit risk 
of the obligor, market conditions, or other factors,” then the creditor must 
review the account “once every six months” to determine if it is eligible for 
an interest rate reduction.105  Finally, the Act prohibits changing most terms 
during the first year of a credit card account, and requires promotional 
interest rates to continue for a six-month minimum.106 
  
                                                                                                                 
 101. Several sections of the Credit CARD Act are omitted from the summary to follow.  
This is because the Act contained regulations of gift cards and other prepaid cards, a number of 
miscellaneous provisions that bear little or no relationship to credit card regulation, and a 
number of “housekeeping” sections with no substantive content. 
 102. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009, Pub. 
L. No. 111-24, sec. 101(a), § 127(i)(1), 123 Stat. 1734, 1735 (to be codified in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 103. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c)(2)(ii) (2010). 
 104. Credit CARD Act sec. 101(b), § 171(b).  The exceptions are (1) increases “upon the 
expiration of a specified [and disclosed] period of time”; (2) increases in a variable annual 
percentage rate (an APR that is tied to an indexed rate) due to changes in the index; (3) 
increases “due to the completion of a workout or temporary hardship arrangement”; and (4) 
penalty increases due to failure of the credit card holder to tender a minimum payment for 60 
days.  Id. 
 105. Id. sec. 101(c), § 148. 
 106. Id. sec. 101(d), § 172. 
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B. Finance Charges 
The Credit CARD Act places limits (some stringent and some not-so-
stringent) on several fees commonly charged by credit card companies.  
Fees for failure to pay in full during an interest-free period are prohibited.107  
Over-the-limit fees are also prohibited unless the credit card consumer has 
expressly elected to allow over-the-limit charges to be approved after 
having been advised of the fee.108  Payment fees are prohibited unless “such 
payment involves an expedited service by a service representative of the 
creditor.”109  Finally, all “penalty” fees (such as late fees) must be 
“reasonable or proportional to [the] omission or violation” that gave rise to 
the fee.110 
The Federal Reserve Board of Governors is tasked with defining 
“reasonable or proportional.”111  The definition, as promulgated in March 
2010, is extraordinarily complex, but does contain at least a few clear-cut 
rules:  “penalty fees may not exceed the dollar amount of the violation” 
(meaning that if a credit card user goes over the limit by five dollars, the 
over-the-limit fee cannot exceed five dollars) and “multiple fees may not be 
assessed for a single violation.”112  Notably, while the Act regulates those 
fees that fall into one of the above fee categories, it does not impose an 
across-the-board ban on the development of new fees, or promulgate a 
schedule of approved fees. 
C. Payments and Due Dates 
The Credit CARD Act contains a number of practical changes which 
help credit card users attain the most beneficial application of their 
payments and make it easier for customers to make payments on time.  
First, payments that are received by 5:00 p.m. on the due date must be 
classified as on time.113  Second, payments must be applied to whatever 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Id. sec. 102(a), § 127. 
 108. Id.  Copies of sample opt-in forms are available at Truth in Lending, Regulation Z, 
Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 37526-01, 37583 (June 29, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). 
 109. Credit CARD Act § 102(a). 
 110. Id. sec. 102(b), § 149. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Matthews, supra note 83, at 72-73.  Professor Matthews has accomplished the 
Herculean task of condensing multiple pages of Federal Regulations into a single paragraph, 
which presents a useful summary of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ highly intricate 
definition of “reasonable and proportional.” 
 113. Credit CARD Act sec. 104, § 164. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
188 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:171 
 
 
balance on the card bears the highest rate of interest.114  Third, payments 
that are late within sixty days of a “material change in the mailing address, 
office, or procedures for handing cardholder payments” cannot cause a late 
fee or other finance charge to be assessed.115  Fourth, payment of fees (other 
than over-the-limit fees, late fees, or insufficient funds fees) during the first 
year of an account can only be charged against 25% of the available 
credit.116  It appears that the goal of this regulation is to force credit card 
companies to close delinquent accounts rather than piling on fees.  
Unfortunately, exempting over-the-limit fees, late fees, and insufficient 
funds fees takes most of the bite out of this regulation.  Fifth, payment due 
dates must be on the same date each month, unless that date is a weekend or 
holiday, in which case the due date must be the next business day.117  
Finally, billing statements must be sent at least twenty-one days before the 
due date.118 
D. Ability to Pay 
One of the Credit CARD Act’s most noteworthy provisions is § 109:  “A 
card issuer may not open any credit card account for any consumer . . . or 
increase any credit limit applicable to such account, unless the card issuer 
considers the ability of the consumer to make the required payments under 
the terms of such account.”119  This provision, while vague, is probably 
intended to have a chilling effect on indiscriminate lending practices, 
especially with respect to highly-profitable non-regular payers.  To the 
extent that it is used to accomplish that purpose, this statute could become 
one of the Credit CARD Act’s most useful and significant substantive 
consumer protections because it has the potential of shifting the risk of 
predatory lending away from consumers by holding lenders accountable for 
indiscriminate offers of credit. 
E. Enhanced Disclosures 
The Credit CARD Act requires each billing statement to contain a payoff 
notice.120  The notice must contain four pieces of information:  (1) the 
                                                                                                                 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. sec. 105, § 127(n). 
 117. Id. sec. 106, § 127(o). 
 118. Id. § 163(a). 
 119. Id. sec. 109, § 150. 
 120. Id. sec. 201, § 157(b)(11).  Anyone who receives a monthly credit card statement has 
no doubt seen one of the new payment notice boxes.  They were one of the first and most 
noticeable changes to take place immediately after the passage of the Credit CARD Act. 
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number of months to pay off the entire balance if only the minimum 
payment is made; (2) the minimum that would have to be made in order to 
pay off the entire balance in thirty-six months; (3) the total cost of choosing 
one of these two payment options; and (4) “a toll-free telephone number at 
which the consumer may receive information about accessing credit 
counseling and debt management services.”121  The information must be “in 
a conspicuous and prominent location on the billing statement” and must be 
“clear and concise.”122  Also, each billing statement must disclose the 
consequences of late payments.123 
F. Special Protections for Targeted Groups 
The Credit CARD Act acknowledges the need of certain targeted groups 
for extra consumer protection.  First, Title III of the Act is devoted to 
additional protections for students, defined as those under the age of 21.124  
Pre-screened offers to students are prohibited.125  No credit card may be 
issued to a student unless signed by a cosigner or unless the student 
indicates an independent means of making payment.126  Second, the Act 
mandates a “Report on Federal Financial and Economic Literacy Education 
Programs”127 and a “GAO Study and Report on Fluency in the English 
Language and Financial Literacy.”128  These reports demonstrate 
congressional interest in providing protections for those with limited 
financial and English language skills. 
In an effort to ensure that all consumers receive adequate protection, the 
Act requires the Federal Reserve Board of Governors to review consumer 
credit plans and revise its regulations as needed every two years.129  Regular 
reviews of consumer credit regulations will keep consumer credit protection 
issues before the Board of Governors on a consistent basis.  It is to be 
hoped that the Act’s neglect of certain consumer groups, such as the 
elderly, may be remedied over time as the biennial reviews reveal which 
consumers have fallen through the cracks of existing regulations.130 
                                                                                                                 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. sec. 202, § 127(b)(12). 
 124. Id. sec. 301, § 127(c). 
 125. Id. sec. 302, § 604(c)(1)(B). 
 126. Id. sec. 303, § 127. 
 127. Id. § 510. 
 128. Id. § 513. 
 129. Id. § 502. 
 130. A word of caution is in order here.  While regular reviews may have the effect of 
strengthening consumer credit protections, they can have a weakening effect as well.  Credit 
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V. Analysis:  The Credit CARD Act and the Elderly 
The Credit CARD Act unquestionably provides a number of significant 
new protections to credit card consumers.  For example, the Act’s 
requirements of greater consistency, predictability, and disclosure from 
credit card companies go a long way toward protecting all credit card users, 
including the elderly.  And while nothing in the Act directly speaks to the 
unique needs of elderly credit card consumers, many of its provisions have 
the potential of preventing elderly persons from becoming weighed down 
by credit card debt in the first place and even providing some relief to those 
who are already struggling with credit card debt.131 
Nonetheless, the Act contains a number of provisions that, while positive 
on their face, contain hidden costs for unwary elderly credit card 
consumers.  The Act simply fails to provide adequate protections to elderly 
credit card consumers threatened by lending practices that are aggressive, 
predatory, and unconscionable.  In many ways, the Act represents little 
more than a cobbling together of a few good ideas and lacks a well-
developed framework designed to ensure that needed protections were not 
omitted.  As two attorneys from the National Consumer Law Center 
remarked in 2007, “major substantive policy changes are not likely to occur 
any time soon.  At best, they will be adopted piecemeal.”132  A detailed 
examination of the Act reveals that this prediction has unfortunately proven 
to be correct.  Given the unique position of elderly persons with respect to 
credit cards, the Act both could and should have done more to ensure that 
elderly credit card consumers receive adequate protection. 
A. Changes in Terms Regulations 
Credit card contracts are adhesion contracts.133  As such, they generally 
give credit card companies sweeping options to change contract terms.134  
                                                                                                                 
card industry participation at the biennial reviews is not likely to diminish over time and 
industry lobbying will inevitably entail requests for lighter regulations and weaker 
enforcement.  Thus, consumer credit advocates must also remain unflagging in their efforts to 
keep the needs of consumers before the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.  The watering-
down over time of the original TILA may serve as a cautionary tale here.  See Peterson, supra 
note 65, at 886-90. 
 131. See Harkness, supra note 7, at 19. 
 132. Loonin & Renuart, supra note 5, at 200. 
 133. “Adhesion Contract.  A standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by 
another party in a weaker position, usu. a consumer, who adheres to the contract with little 
choice about the terms.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 143 (3d pocket ed. 1996). 
 134. See Peter A. Alces & Michael M. Greenfield, They Can Do What!? Limitations on the 
Use of Change-in-Terms Clauses, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1099, 1101 (2010). 
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Given that a defining trait of the current generation of elderly credit card 
users is “trust,” the ability of credit card companies to “pull the rug” out 
from under an unsuspecting consumer by means of changes to the terms of 
a credit card contract can have a highly unsettling impact on an elderly 
credit card user and his financial security.135  Unfortunately, while the 
Credit CARD Act requires disclosure of changes in terms, there is no 
substantive regulation restricting or limiting the time and manner in which 
terms may change, eliminating any sense of security for credit card 
consumers.136  For instance, the Act’s requirement of forty-five days of 
notice of changes in terms, as opposed to the former requirement of fifteen 
days,137 provides cold comfort when the notice includes “take it or leave it” 
terms that are adverse to the elderly credit card consumer.138  Because the 
Act imposes almost no limit on changes in terms as long as credit card 
companies comply with disclosure and timing requirements, the only 
constant in the world of credit will continue to be change. 
The Act’s only remedy for changes in terms which are unsatisfactory to a 
consumer is to close the account.139  Indeed, under the Act, a credit card 
company may effectively force a consumer to terminate his account by 
presenting a Hobson’s choice between accepting intolerable new terms and 
conditions or foregoing access to credit entirely.  An elderly credit card 
consumer faced with this choice may not feel that he is able to close the 
account (due to need for credit) even if an announced change in terms 
might prove problematic for him.  Whether the credit card functions as a 
“safety net” or as a liquidity device to ameliorate the challenges of living on 
a fixed income, outright account closure may not be a viable option.  The 
elderly person may fear that if he rejects the change in terms and closes the 
account then no further credit will be available to him from any source 
because of his age.  In spite of this possibility, the Act fails to provide any 
means other than account closure for an elderly credit card consumer to 
protest, reject, or renegotiate a unilateral and unsatisfactory change in 
terms. 
To the extent that risk-averse elderly credit card consumers are unable or 
unwilling to close accounts upon notification of changes in terms, the 
                                                                                                                 
 135. See Harkness, supra note 5, at 3-4. 
 136. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-24, sec. 101(a), § 127, 123 Stat. 1734, 1738 (to be codified in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 137. See Paulsen, supra note 11, at 138. 
 138. See Credit CARD Act sec. 101(a), § 127. 
 139. Id. 
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elderly are more likely to bear the costs of changes in terms than younger 
credit card consumers who are in a better position to close unsatisfactory 
accounts and apply for cards with more consumer-friendly terms.  Indeed, if 
one assumes along with Elizabeth Warren that credit card terms and 
conditions are based on “a price the company believes it can charge without 
causing the consumer to cancel the card,” then it seems inevitable that 
credit card companies will continue to charge the most of those who are 
least able to cancel:  elderly credit card consumers.140 
The Act does impose one limitation on creditors who increase interest 
rates on accounts based on “the credit risk of the obligor, market conditions, 
or other factors.”141  Creditors who do so are required to review the account 
every six months to see if it is eligible for an interest rate reduction.142  If 
the interest rate was raised due to failure to make minimum payments and 
the consumer establishes six months of good payment history, the Act 
requires the creditor to lower the interest rate to its pre-penalty level: 
This statutory cure provision, which enables delinquent debtors 
to reinstate the non-default contract interest rates, is among the 
strongest of the consumer protections afforded by the CARD 
Act; although most defaulting debtors may not be in a position to 
avail themselves of it, for those who are, it will be a definite 
benefit.143 
Outside of this narrow relief provision, however, nothing in the Act 
prohibits creditors from imposing interest rate increases based on “credit 
risks” that are tied to elder-specific factors which will never go away 
precisely because they are tied to the age of the elderly credit card user—a 
quintessentially irreversible factor.  For example, creditors might raise 
interest rates when an elderly customer begins to receive Social Security 
benefits because this signals a “risk” that the elderly person’s income may 
be reduced from former levels and that a reduction in payments may follow.  
Or creditors might choose to label age itself as a “risk” factor, raising 
interest rates on every customer who reaches the age of sixty-five, with 
adjustments for further risk every five years thereafter.144  In such cases, no 
                                                                                                                 
 140. Warren Testimony, supra note 2, at 4. 
 141. Credit CARD Act sec. 101(c), § 148. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Harkness, supra note 7, at 13. 
 144. This is not an implausible scenario.  Because credit card debt is unsecured, a primary 
factor affecting repayment is time—either time for the credit card consumer to pay voluntarily 
or time for the credit card company to sue for repayment and obtain a judgment against a 
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matter how many times and with no matter how much assiduousness the 
creditor performs the mandatory six-month review, the review process will 
never have the effect of reducing the elderly credit card consumer’s interest 
rate for the duration of that consumer’s life. 
B. Finance Charges Regulations 
The Credit CARD Act regulates, to some extent, all of the major 
creditor-originated fees, including penalty fees (such as late fees), over-the-
limit fees, and payment fees.145  The Act fails to regulate fees that are 
debtor-originated, including over-the-limit fees that result once the debtor 
“opts-in” to over-the-limit extensions of credit,146 and third party billing 
charges that result from a number of debtor missteps.147  While both of 
these types of charges can impact any credit card user, their impact on 
elderly credit card users is particularly severe. 
The Act allows credit card companies to provide an “opt-in” option for 
over-the-limit transactions.148  Basically, the credit card consumer must 
give permission for the credit card company to allow an over-the-limit 
transaction.149  This permission is only valid if the credit card company has 
disclosed any over-the-limit fees that may result.150  In spite of this required 
disclosure, the interest of credit card companies in profit maximization will 
result in aggressive attempts by credit card companies to “sell” consumers 
on the idea of over-the-limit transactions.  These sales attempts will have a 
disparate impact on elderly credit card consumers, given elderly persons’ 
propensity to be confused by complex financial information and high-
                                                                                                                 
delinquent debtor.  Even then, payment may be difficult to obtain if the credit card consumer 
simply lacks assets necessary for repayment.  The lesser the debtor’s assets, the longer 
repayment will take.  It is a fact of life that old age, which frequently entails a reduction in 
income and assets, is also accompanied by a reduction in the time remaining during which a 
credit card consumer can tender payment.  Of course, after the death of a debtor, the creditor 
may present a claim against the debtor’s estate, but there is no guarantee of repayment if estate 
assets are simply lacking or are protected from creditor claims through estate planning devices 
such as trusts and statutory protections such as homestead.  See Harkness, supra note 5, at 26 
(“[I]f the estate is insolvent, the creditor will then be the one that must ultimately bear the 
loss.”).  Thus, furnishing unsecured credit to elderly persons presents a direct risk of loss to 
credit card companies. 
 145. See Credit CARD Act sec. 102, § 127. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See Prentiss Cox, The Invisible Hand of Preacquired Account Marketing, 47 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 425, 425 (2010). 
 148. Credit CARD Act § 102. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. 
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pressure sales techniques.151  The Act fails to regulate the extent to which 
credit card companies may attempt to entice consumers to agree to over-
the-limit transactions and their accompanying fees.  The Act also continues 
to allow credit card companies “to extend credit in excess of consumer 
credit limits in the absence of this election, but only if they are willing to do 
so without charging any over the limit fees.”152  Thus, elderly credit card 
consumers, believing that by opting-out they will avoid exceeding their 
credit limit entirely, may be surprised when their credit card company 
simply sidesteps their decision to opt-out by approving over-the-limit 
transactions (without the fee) in order to increase their total indebtedness. 
The Act also fails to regulate third party billing practices.  In brief, a 
definition of third party billing is: 
[A] sales practice that allows companies to charge consumers for 
services they do not know they have ordered and do not use.  
The practice depends on a seller’s ability to access a consumer’s 
financial account without the consumer directly providing her 
account number to that seller.  This is possible because the seller 
has paid either a financial institution, such as a bank, or another 
seller who retains consumer account numbers for the right to 
charge the consumer’s account.153 
A typical third party billing involves some sort of gimmick, such as a 
“free trial offer,” which if not rejected, constitutes acceptance of an offer 
for a subscription to a product or service.154  Very frequently, these 
“services” are of little or no value to elderly credit card consumers.  While 
the origin of the third party charge is usually an outside enterprise, credit 
card companies also market similar “services” directly.  For example, the 
court in Discover Bank v. Owens found that: 
[Owens’] account was debited $10.43 for a Discover card 
product called CreditSafe Plus, which evidently would put her 
payments and finance charges on hold without affecting her 
credit rating should she become unemployed, hospitalized, or 
disabled.  Presumably, since Owens was on Social Security 
                                                                                                                 
 151. See Moore & Schaefer, supra note 25, at 518-19; see also Harkness, supra note 7, at 
15 (criticizing the  Credit CARD Act’s over-the-limit opt-in provision for failing to require that 
customers who have opted-in be notified that a particular transaction will put them over their 
credit limit). 
 152. Harkness, supra note 7, at 15. 
 153. Cox, supra note 147, at 425. 
 154. See id. at 428-37 (detailing a number of third party billing schemes). 
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Disability and already unemployed, the CreditSafe product 
pertained only to the eventuality of her becoming 
hospitalized. . . . At what point in the life of an unemployed, 
disabled, impoverished person was such a product ever designed 
to be used?155 
It is precisely because of the tricky nature of third party and direct 
product billing practices that elderly credit card consumers are highly 
vulnerable to such schemes.156  In the case of a third party billing, the credit 
card company itself escapes the “appearance of evil” by simply billing the 
credit card account for the third party service and reaping the benefits of 
fees charged to the third party company for account access and also finance 
charges stemming from the increase in total account debt.  In the case of 
direct product billing, the credit card company also enjoys almost pure 
profit by charging consumers for nearly-useless “products.”  While analysis 
of third party billing has prompted calls for separate legislative treatment,157 
the Credit CARD Act could and should have tackled the credit card 
industry’s use and abuse of this practice.  As the law stands today, credit 
card companies are not even required to disclose third party billing 
practices, let alone put a stop to them. 
The Act contains two provisions regarding creditor-originated fees which 
are likely to have a disproportionate impact on elderly credit card 
consumers.  First, the Act allows payment fees when payments “involve an 
expedited service by a service representative of the creditor.”158  In practice, 
this provision means that payments made over the phone within a few 
business days of the due date can incur a payment charge.159  But elderly 
credit card consumers, especially those that are homebound, are much more 
likely than other age groups to use the phone to make their credit card 
payments, thus incurring the fee.160  Second, the Act’s requirement that 
                                                                                                                 
 155. 822 N.E.2d 869, 871-72, 874 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. 2004).  Ms. Owens was eventually 
charged $369.52 for the CreditSafe Plus product.  See id. at 872. 
 156. See Cox, supra note 147, at 438-61 (presenting a detailed analysis of how third party 
billing practices are intentionally designed to be confusing). 
 157. See id. at 425. 
 158. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009, Pub. 
L. No. 111-24, sec. 102(a), §127(l), 123 Stat. 1734, 1740 (to be codified in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C.). 
 159. See Written Testimony of Michael D. Donovan:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. On 
Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 9 (2007) [hereinafter Donovan Testimony] 
(statement of Michael D. Donovan, Partner, Donovan Searles, LLC). 
 160. See Moore & Schaefer, supra note 25, at 518 (noting that senior citizens “depend on 
the telephone for contact with . . . the outside world”). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
196 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:171 
 
 
certain fees be “reasonable and proportional” to the violation that gave rise 
to the fee will almost certainly prompt credit card companies to raise 
minimum payments so that a higher dollar amount will then be associated 
with certain violations, such as late payments.161  To the extent that a cash-
strapped elderly credit card consumer is unable to make these higher 
minimum payments, he will accrue even more fees. 
Finally, the Act’s failure to prohibit the creation of new fees or to 
promulgate a list of approved fees has prompted credit card companies to 
develop a number of new fees.  Credit card companies are infamous for 
their endless creativity in devising new fees.162  With no limitations on fees 
outside of those explicitly covered by the Act, creditors may be expected to 
develop a number of new revenue-raising techniques:  “The card companies 
employ teams of people whose sole job is to jigger and re-jigger credit card 
terms so that more money drains out of consumers’ pockets—and, with a 
little luck, the consumer won’t even notice until it is too late.”163 
For example, credit card companies are compensating for lost revenue 
caused by Credit CARD Act provisions by “product changing” customers 
into cards that have annual fees.164  Typically, a consumer is not aware that 
an annual fee has been added to his card until after it is charged to his 
account.  Given elderly persons’ difficulties with understanding financial 
documents and reading small print, the addition of an annual fee to an 
elderly credit card consumer’s account is likely to go undetected by that 
consumer.  Elderly credit card consumers who keep their card as a “safety 
net” for emergencies may expect that nothing will be charged to their card 
without their knowledge and consent.  If such consumers are unaware that 
an annual fee has been added to their account, they will neglect to tender 
payment and late fees and other charges soon follow.  As another example, 
the Credit CARD Act does not prohibit credit card companies from 
charging fees to receive a paper bill.165  While credit card companies may 
assert that paper bill fees are prompted by altruistic environmental concerns 
related to reducing creation of paper waste,166 the reality is that e-billing 
                                                                                                                 
 161. Credit CARD Act sec. 102(b), § 149(a). 
 162. See Donovan Testimony, supra note 159, at 9-10 (listing over thirteen fees charged by 
credit card companies, including set-up fees charged to open a credit card account and fees for 
furnishing credit card customers with the actual plastic card required to make purchases). 
 163. Warren Testimony, supra note 2, at 6. 
 164. Don Mecoy, Credit CARD Act of 2009:  Taking the Good with the Bad, DAILY 
OKLAHOMAN, Sep. 5, 2010, at 6C. 
 165. After logging on to almost any credit card account management website, customers 
must click through a screen asking them to enroll in e-billing. 
 166. See, e.g., Get Paperless Statements & Save Trees, DISCOVER FIN. SERVICES, http:// 
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saves credit card companies postage costs while simultaneously increasing 
the chance that a consumer may forget or be unable to access and read their 
statement online, thus allowing late fees to kick in.  Penalizing paper bill 
use has a disparate effect on those elderly persons who are unable or 
unwilling to transact financial business over the Internet and on those who 
simply prefer, for personal reasons, to receive hard copies of their financial 
statements. 
C. Payment and Due Date Regulations 
Some of the Credit CARD Act’s payment and due date regulations are 
helpful to elderly credit card consumers.  In particular, the regulations 
governing payment procedure provide much-needed certainty regarding 
exactly when payments are due.167  The simple fact of a mandatory regular 
due date will help elderly consumers remember when payments are due and 
avoid late fees.  The “next business day” provision for due dates falling on 
a weekend or holiday are beneficial to those elderly credit card consumers 
who, for cultural or personal reasons, may not expect businesses to be open 
on those days and may time their payment accordingly.168  Unfortunately, 
while the Act’s payment and due date regulations provide some basic relief 
to paying customers on the micro level, it is on the macro level that the 
Act’s protections for elderly credit card consumers are potentially non-
existent, as the next section shows. 
D. Ability to Pay Requirement 
Section 109 of the Credit CARD Act requires credit card companies to 
consider “ability to pay” before extending credit.169  Yet this requirement is 
so vague that it provides little real protection to elderly credit card 
consumers.  Elderly credit card consumers’ abilities to pay may be limited 
by a number of financial factors including high costs of living, low 
incomes, and overall reduced wealth.  Because many of these factors may 
be new and unfamiliar to elderly credit card consumers, their own ability to 
furnish a credit card company with an accurate assessment of their ability to 
pay may be limited.  In addition, issues of capacity and identity may impair 
                                                                                                                 
www.discovercard.com/customer-service/statements/paperless.html (last visited Feb. 13, 
2011). 
 167. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009, 
sec. 104, 106, §§ 164, 127, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734,1741-43 (to be codified in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 168. See id. § 106. 
 169. Id. sec. 109, § 150. 
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the ability of a credit card company to fulfill its duties under the Act.  Issues 
of capacity implicate the need for credit card companies to assess whether 
an elderly credit card applicant is competent to enter into a credit card 
contract.170  Issues of identity implicate the need for credit card companies 
to ensure that applications in the name of an elderly person in fact 
originated with that person.  
Perhaps because of these challenges, the Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors did not promulgate a strict regulation to implement § 109 of the 
Credit CARD Act:  “the Board’s regulations provide that the reasonable 
measure of the consumer’s ability to pay centers around the ability to make 
minimum payments.”171  This regulation is so deferential to creditors as to 
have the effect of rendering this section of the Credit CARD Act nearly 
moot.  While the Act has the apparent effect of shifting the risk of lending 
away from borrowers and onto credit card companies, its vagueness largely 
eliminates any additional burden for creditors because in the absence of 
specific rules, it is simply too easy for creditors to rebut an allegation that 
they did not consider a particular elderly credit card consumer’s “ability to 
pay.”  Weakened by its own vagueness and feeble regulatory 
implementation, § 109 of the Credit CARD Act, while having the potential 
to be greatly helpful in preventing improvident extensions of credit to 
vulnerable elderly persons, in fact lacks the necessary teeth to accomplish 
its purpose. 
E. Enhanced Disclosures 
The Credit CARD Act requires credit card companies to include a 
complex payoff disclosure with each billing statement.172  The disclosure 
includes two payoff options (minimum payment and thirty-six-month 
payoff payment) along with the total amount that the consumer will pay 
under either option.173  Thus, at least four dollar amounts are listed next to 
one another for comparison purposes, one of which matches the minimum 
payment due.  Elderly credit card consumers confronting this disclosure 
may become confused and remit more payment than is actually due.  While 
paying more than the minimum payment is generally beneficial to any 
credit card holder, paying more than the minimum because of confusion 
may not be beneficial for someone on a fixed income. 
                                                                                                                 
 170. See Paulsen, supra note 11, at 133. 
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 172. See Credit CARD Act sec. 201, § 127(b)(11). 
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The Act further requires the payoff disclosure to include a “credit 
counseling” phone number.174  Elderly credit card consumers are likely to 
conduct business over the phone and may inaccurately conclude that the 
credit counseling number is a regular customer service number.  Yet 
phoning a credit counseling service can open up an elderly credit card 
consumer to additional financial trouble and potential exploitation: 
Despite their promises of debt relief, many of these counseling 
agencies exploit their customer’s vulnerabilities and leave them 
deeper in financial trouble.  For starters, credit counseling 
agency fees are often excessive, depriving consumers of funds 
that they could otherwise use to pay off debts.  After receiving a 
superficial financial analysis, many consumers are pushed into 
debt management plans (“DMPs”) that they cannot afford.  
These DMPs generally are developed through arrangements 
between credit counseling agencies and creditors.  They can help 
consumers if the concessions offered by the creditors are 
meaningful, but creditors have persistently cut back on their 
concessions in recent years.175 
Thus, the Act’s required payoff disclosure may actually harm elderly 
credit card consumers more than help them. 
F. Special Protections for Targeted Groups 
The Credit CARD Act includes protections for young people176 and 
mandates financial literacy studies.177  While the studies may have some 
tangential benefits to elderly persons, the Act as a whole lacks special 
protections for elderly credit card consumers. 
On the one hand, including special protections for a specific age group, 
but not including protections for the elderly sets an unfortunate precedent 
for omitting protections for elderly credit card consumers from future 
consumer credit protection legislation.  Such a precedent is dismaying, 
given that many characteristics of elderly credit card users strongly indicate 
a need for special protections.  On the other hand, the inclusion of special 
protections for a segment of population based on their age (young people) 
implies that Congress might be willing to consider special protections for 
elderly credit card users.  Improvements to the special protections for young 
                                                                                                                 
 174. Id. 
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Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
200 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:171 
 
 
people will almost certainly be considered in the future, given that criticism 
is already being leveled against them.178  When such improvements are 
considered, Congress can and should also consider enacting statutory 
protections for elderly credit card consumers. 
As long as elderly persons lack a consumer credit protection statute 
specifically targeted to their needs and vulnerabilities, credit card 
companies, facing potential losses from their reduced ability to issue cards 
to young consumers, will compensate for these losses by shifting them to 
current account holders.  Thus, in addition to enjoying no special 
protections under the Act, the elderly will ultimately bear part of the cost of 
protecting other favored groups. 
VI. Finding Protection for Elderly Credit Card Consumers:  A Proposed 
Solution 
In the years leading up to the passage of the Credit CARD Act, there 
were many calls for reform of existing law, some of which examined the 
problem of consumer credit protection through the lens of the unique needs 
of elderly credit card consumers.179  These proposals highlighted the 
challenges of passing special consumer credit protections for the elderly.  
Indeed, some questioned whether the elderly required any special 
protections at all.180  A proposal for an elder-specific consumer credit 
protection statute must begin by acknowledging this debate and explaining 
why such a statute is necessary.  Therefore, some responses to various 
criticisms of the alleged need for an elder-specific consumer credit 
protection statute are presented below. 
In addition, several valuable contributions have already been made 
regarding protections for elderly credit card consumers.  Unfortunately, 
many well-intentioned recent proposals fall short for one of two reasons.  
First, some proposals consist almost entirely of ideas which were fully 
incorporated into the Credit CARD Act.181  Yet, as has been shown, the Act 
                                                                                                                 
 178. See Regina L. Hinson, Credit Card Reform Goes to College, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 
287, 288, 307-08 (2010) (criticizing the Credit CARD Act’s protections for young people for 
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not only fails to protect elderly credit card consumers but also imposes a 
number of significant new costs on them.  Second, some proposals focus on 
solving a narrow issue while overlooking the big picture need for a 
comprehensive statutory solution to the problems facing elderly credit card 
consumers.  For example, one proposal recommends statutory regulation of 
third-party billing alone.182  While these proposals may be quite useful, 
some synthesis needs to be done in order to prevent further legislative work 
from merely extending the ad hoc approach that has characterized consumer 
credit protection statutes thus far. 
Ultimately, adding provisions to the existing Act or passing piecemeal 
statutes that address a smattering of elder-specific issues will not result in 
robust consumer protections for elderly credit card consumers.  Instead, 
Congress should enact a consumer protection statute that specifically 
targets the needs of elderly credit card consumers.  This section contains a 
number of statutory recommendations that aim to resolve some of the 
concerns addressed above regarding the unique vulnerabilities of elderly 
credit card consumers under existing law. 
Finally, although existing law is clearly inadequate to protect elderly 
credit card consumers, it does provide some protection.  Elderly credit card 
consumers should take full advantage of the few substantive protections the 
Credit CARD Act and Regulation Z actually provide.  Meanwhile, a small 
but growing cohort of judges are leading the way in applying traditional 
contract doctrines in new ways in order to prevent financial exploitation of 
elderly credit card consumers.  For the practitioner and her elderly client, a 
review of existing statutory and judicial resources is far more helpful than 
calls for future reform.  For that reason, this section concludes with a brief 
summary of how attorneys and their elderly credit card holding clients can 
find some limited protection under existing law. 
A. The Need for Elder-Specific Consumer Credit Protection 
Some commentators have proposed that general consumer protections 
are sufficient to protect the elderly.183  They suggest that the real problem is 
that existing consumer protection statutes are adequate in content but 
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TILA”). 
 182. See Cox, supra note 147, at 481-82. 
 183. See, e.g., Loonin & Renuart, supra note 5, at 189-90 (“Generally, we favor policy 
reforms that apply to the general public unless the problem to be addressed affects only elders.  
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inadequate in enforcement, leaving all persons, including the elderly, 
vulnerable.184  In 2007, Elizabeth Warren agreed that “[e]ncouraging more 
vigorous oversight from regulatory commissions so that they use the tools 
at their disposal more effectively would make a difference.”185  Certainly, 
stronger enforcement would have the effect of protecting all consumers, 
regardless of age.  Nonetheless, given that many credit card industry 
practices have a disproportionately harmful effect on elderly credit card 
consumers, elder-specific statutory protections are necessary regardless of 
how existing laws are enforced.  In fact, regulators may be more likely to 
enforce a specifically-tailored statute, given the ability to target 
enforcement efforts to a specific population. 
Some commentators have expressed concern regarding the potential for 
elder-specific consumer protection laws to be paternalistic—shielding 
competent elderly consumers from full participation in the market:  “The 
key question is whether the benefits of special protections for vulnerable 
elders outweigh the loss of autonomy for those who are competent and able 
to make independent decisions.”186  The concern here is one of balance.  
Certainly, consumer protection laws which unduly cabin the rights of fully 
competent elderly persons to engage freely in financial decision-making 
and market participation are excessive in one direction.  The current state of 
the law, however, with its lack of meaningful protections for elderly credit 
card consumers, shows a lack of balance in the other direction.  While the 
drafter of an elder-specific consumer credit protection statute must remain 
sensitive to the need for balance, this sensitivity should not prompt him to 
abandon the endeavor entirely.  While some have even suggested that 
robust elder-specific consumer protection could result in elderly persons 
being squeezed out of the market, it is important to remember that 
“additional credit is not beneficial to borrowers if its terms are unfair.”187 
A final concern regarding elder-specific consumer credit protection 
legislation is the notion that the difficulties that elderly persons face under 
the current state of the law are largely of their own making:  “Spending 
sprees and living beyond one’s means can leave someone in a deep hole 
with credit card debt.  For those mistakes, people need to take 
responsibility.”188  One must consider the bigger picture, however, before 
passing judgment on struggling credit card debtors: 
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In a world in which real incomes are not rising, while mortgage 
costs, health insurance, child care and transportation continue 
their upward climb, credit card debt is not just about the 
profligate.  It is about hard-working, play-by-the-rules families 
who are doing their best but who, in the ups and downs of 
everyday life, sometimes need credit.  Only after they have 
seized the rope offered by the credit card companies, do some of 
them discover that the other end is tied to an anchor.189 
It is precisely to protect this second kind of consumer that elder-specific 
consumer credit protection statutes are necessary.  Elderly persons are 
much more likely to find themselves in the latter category of “sometimes 
needing credit” than in the former category of “profligate spenders.”190  
Unfortunately, regardless of the reason why an elderly person acquires 
credit card debt in the first place, that person will quickly discover that the 
law affords little more than the most barebones protections. 
Thus, contrary to the assertion that the elderly do not need or deserve 
special consumer credit protections and may actually be harmed by any 
such laws, it is clear that the unique position of elderly persons with respect 
to credit cards compels the conclusion that elder-specific protections are in 
fact necessary. 
B. Suggestions for an Elder-Specific Consumer Credit Statute 
Drafting a comprehensive elder-specific consumer protection statute is 
beyond the scope of a single article.  Regulation in this area is staggering in 
its length and its complexity.191  Indeed, the impenetrability of consumer 
credit law has been a frequent complaint of consumer advocates, who 
believe that vital protections are choked by a maze of superfluous 
regulations.192  Therefore, it is not the intent of this proposal to draft a 
thorough legislative blueprint or to impose limits on what ought to be 
considered.  Rather, this proposal draws on lessons learned during the last 
half-century from American consumer credit protection law to suggest 
some fundamental and practical elder-specific protections that should not 
be omitted from any substantive elder-specific consumer protection statute. 
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 190. See Harkness, supra note 7, at 12-13 (explaining that although elderly persons are 
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slope of credit card use claims many elderly victims). 
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the Credit CARD Act are “complicated, detailed, and lengthy”). 
 192. See Peterson, supra note 65, at 814-15. 
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1. Changes in Terms 
There are two approaches to changes in terms regulations for elderly 
credit card consumers that seem particularly sound.  The first involves an 
outright ban on changes in terms absent cardholder consent once consumers 
reach a certain age.  The second, more creditor-friendly approach, involves 
imposing on creditors a duty of good faith and fair dealing.193  Both 
approaches involve shifting some of the risk of lending back onto the 
creditor by requiring both borrower and lender to maintain original terms 
throughout the life of the loan.  The simplicity of either of these approaches 
would cut through the complex changes in terms rules that apply today, 
enabling elderly credit card consumers to understand their financial 
positions better. 
The first approach has the advantage of being both simple and elegant:  a 
statutory provision adopting this approach would simply ban changes in 
terms after a specified age (seventy-five, for example) on existing accounts 
unless the cardholder consented to the change.  If terms were changed in a 
manner adverse to the cardholder during the twenty-four months preceding 
the cardholder’s reaching the statutory age, the burden would be on the 
credit card company to establish that the reason for changing terms was not 
based on the upcoming age deadline.   
This approach is not without its shortfalls.  It is so strict that it would 
necessitate giving credit card companies the option to close the account 
outright in certain specified circumstances, since a flat ban would prevent 
them from using a change in terms to ensure that problematic accounts 
remained profitable.  For example, no credit card company should be forced 
to keep an account open when payments are not being made.  The negative 
impact that such account closure might have on the elderly credit card 
consumer, however, should be cushioned by extending the required notice 
to a period of substantial length, perhaps six months.  This would provide 
the elderly credit card consumer time to make other financial arrangements 
before the account was closed. 
The second approach of imposing a statutory duty of good faith and fair 
dealing on changes in terms has the advantage of being more flexible for 
both the creditor and the debtor.  On the creditor’s side, the ability to 
change terms allows the creditor to retain profitability in the face of 
changes in debtor behavior.  On the debtor’s side, the ability for the lender 
to change terms means that the lender may be more willing to extend credit 
in larger amounts and over longer periods of time, as needed.  To avoid 
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reentering the morass of tricks and gimmicks that exists under current law, 
however, the statutory duty would be accompanied by a cause of action for 
a debtor to assert that the creditor has breached this duty with respect to a 
particular change in terms.194  While a return to the flurry of litigation that 
followed the 1968 enactment of TILA might be unhelpful,195 a solid 
increase in successful litigation by elderly credit card consumers could go a 
long way toward putting the credit card industry on notice that mistreatment 
of their elderly customers is unacceptable. 
Undoubtedly other methods of preventing unpredictable and 
disadvantageous changes in terms for elderly credit card consumers are 
available.  What is clear is that an elder-specific consumer credit protection 
statute must impose substantive limitations on such changes. 
2. Finance Charges 
Presumably, changes in terms regulations would prohibit the surprise 
introduction of new fees—one of the most serious problems discussed 
above.  But an elder-specific consumer credit protection statute must also 
address “debtor-originated” fees such as over-the-limit opt-in fees196 and 
third party billing fees.197 
The Credit CARD Act’s consent-based approach to over-the-limit fees is 
useful.  However, substantive protections are needed to ensure that 
marketing techniques designed to sell this option are fair and reasonable.  
Creditors should be limited to offering over-the-limit opt-ins to their elderly 
consumers to only a few times a year, perhaps every six months.  Such a 
limitation would help prevent elderly consumers from being harassed into 
accepting over-the-limit charges.  An occasional statement insert, modeled 
after the Federal Reserve Board of Governor’s recommendations,198 would 
allow elderly credit card consumers time to reach a thoughtful decision as 
to whether this option might be right for them.  Meanwhile, full disclosure 
of the results of such a decision should be mandatory.  If the elderly credit 
                                                                                                                 
 194. See id. at 195-96 (noting that strengthening consumer credit protection laws and 
providing causes of action requires additional legislative efforts to ensure that elderly persons 
have real access to the justice system). 
 195. See Peterson, supra note 65, at 886-87. 
 196. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-24, sec. 102(a), § 127, 123 Stat. 1734, 1738 (to be codified in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 197. See Cox, supra note 147, at 480 (“Preacquired account marketing [third party billing] 
should be banned.”). 
 198. See Truth in Lending, Regulation Z, 75 Fed. Reg. 37526-01, 37583 (June 29, 2010) (to 
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). 
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card consumer decides to accept over-the-limit transactions and fees, he 
should be informed as to the consequences of that decision, including 
whether or not the credit card company will notify him when an over-the-
limit transaction has occurred.  If the elderly credit card consumer decides 
to reject over-the-limit transactions and fees, he should be advised as to 
how the credit card company will treat attempts to use a credit line beyond 
its limit. 
Unlike over-the-limit fees, which may be a helpful option for some 
consumers, the economic consequences of third party billing are extreme: 
Preacquired marketing [third party billing] works like an 
invisible hand.  Not the sort that magically aligns buyers and 
sellers in equilibrium to promote maximum wealth.  Rather, an 
invisible hand that selectively reaches into the pockets of those 
consumers who fall victim to this practice. . . . It appears that 
almost none of the consumers whose accounts are charged are 
aware of or want the service, and the deceptive effect of this type 
of marketing falls hardest on those with the least defenses 
against marketplace misconduct—people with limited English 
language skill or mental diminishment.199 
Given the foregoing statement, it seems obvious that an elder-specific 
consumer credit protection statute must simply ban third party billing 
outright.  Elderly credit card consumers should not be burdened with the 
frustration of sorting out legitimate from illegitimate charges and 
attempting to reverse charges that they never approved in the first place.  
On this point, a page of anecdote is worth a volume of logic.200 
3. Financial Literacy 
While the American tradition of consumer credit regulation has strongly 
favored disclosure,201 it makes no difference whether a consumer receives 
reams of detailed financial guidance or a single well-drafted tip sheet if that 
consumer lacks the literacy skills necessary to understand and make 
beneficial use of the information.  Indeed, “only 4% of Americans have 
sufficient quantitative literacy skills to compare and contrast credit card 
offers . . . .”202  Therefore, while acknowledging that consumer credit 
education is not a “panacea” for every ill that plagues the unfortunate 
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relationship between elderly persons and the credit card industry,203 an 
elder-specific consumer protection statute must nonetheless provide for 
substantial resources to be devoted to educating elderly credit card 
consumers.  Such education should be accompanied by consumer research 
that focuses on the unique characteristics and vulnerabilities of elderly 
credit card consumers.  While the two literacy studies mandated by the 
Credit CARD Act are a helpful starting point,204 they should be 
supplemented by ongoing consumer research of the elderly and their 
relationship to the credit industry.205 
4. Extensions of Credit 
It is imperative that an elder-specific consumer protection statute 
strengthen the mandate of § 109 of the Credit CARD Act requiring credit 
card companies to consider ability to pay.206  Elderly credit card consumers 
face unique financial circumstances—while most of them are guaranteed a 
regular income through Social Security, retirement benefits, or pensions, 
that income is often quite small, especially compared to the income enjoyed 
by most elderly persons prior to retirement.  The following statement of 
principle from two National Consumer Law Center staff attorneys 
articulates a balanced approach: 
[L]enders should make loans only when they are suitable for the 
consumer’s purposes and circumstances, and only after ensuring 
the consumer’s ability to repay the loan from future income.  
Lenders are generally in the position of understanding the short-
term and long-term costs and risks of credit to the consumer and 
should be required to use that knowledge to avoid damaging the 
consumer.  Lenders must realistically evaluate the consumer’s 
ability to afford not just the loan in question, but also all other 
necessities of life.207 
This approach would shift some of the risk of lending to elderly persons 
back onto the lenders themselves.  It should be accompanied by an 
                                                                                                                 
 203. Id. 
 204. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-24, §§ 510, 513, 123 Stat. 1734, 1762, 1765-66 (to be codified in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 205. See Paulsen, supra note 11, at 163 (concluding that elder-specific consumer research is 
necessary in order to insure that consumer credit regulations adequately protect that age group). 
 206. Credit CARD Act sec. 109, § 150. 
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affirmative defense that an elderly person could raise if they could not meet 
their credit card obligations and were faced with a lawsuit, namely, that the 
lender did not conduct a good faith ability-to-pay analysis before extending 
credit to the elderly consumer.  If substantive “ability to pay” regulations 
were put into place and firmly enforced with respect to elderly credit card 
consumers, the need for other regulatory solutions would gradually 
diminish as predatory lending fell by the wayside. 
C. Seeking Refuge Under Existing Law 
Since the goal of this article is elder consumer protection, it would be 
remiss to conclude without stating the protections and remedies available to 
elderly credit card consumers under existing law.  While elderly credit card 
consumers should not be satisfied with the Credit CARD Act, they should 
not hesitate to take full advantage of what protections it does offer.  
Similarly, elderly credit card consumers, and their attorneys, should be 
aware that limited remedies do exist through the courts.  
Elderly credit card consumers confronting changes in terms should first 
and foremost be admonished to take their time.  The Credit CARD Act’s 
requirement of forty-five days of notice provides some time for the elderly 
person to make sure that they understand the implications of a change to 
their account or to seek assistance if they do not understand.208  Also, 
elderly credit card consumers should confirm with their credit card 
company what date is to be the regular due date for payments and keep 
track of this due date, preferably using a calendar.  Because the due date 
cannot be arbitrarily changed without notice, it is now possible to plan 
several months in advance.209  Finally, most elderly credit card consumers 
should be encouraged to opt-out of over-the-limit transactions or revoke if 
they have already opted-in.210  Opting-in to over-the-limit transactions will 
almost certainly remain an option and the elderly credit card consumer can 
choose to opt-in at a later time in order to make a specific purchase or when 
he otherwise believes it is in his best interest to do so. 
Elderly credit card consumers should be educated regarding their rights 
under the Credit CARD Act and encouraged to contact their credit card 
company when they believe those rights have been violated.  To that end, 
elderly credit card consumers should also be encouraged to keep thorough 
records of their dealings with their credit card company, including 
statements and other mailings, telephone conversations, and so on.  Even if 
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the elderly credit card consumer cannot put his finger on what has gone 
wrong with his account, detailed records will help an attorney or financial 
advisor assist the elderly credit card consumer in determining whether a 
violation of the Credit CARD Act has occurred. 
While judicial empathy for the plight of elderly credit card users has 
been tepid at best,211 elderly credit card consumers have begun to win 
limited victories using contract law theories.  For example, Discover Bank 
v. Owens was an important decision for elderly victims of abusive credit 
card industry practices.212  The Ohio judge in that case applied several 
contract doctrines including duty to mitigate damages, unjust enrichment, 
and unconscionability in reaching a judgment for an elderly defendant who 
could not repay her credit card debt.213  In reaching his unconscionability 
holding, the judge sharply criticized Discover Bank for continuing to pile 
on charges which had no connection to any value received by the 
cardholder.214  Notably, Ohio’s consumer protection unconscionability 
statute lists the following factor designed to protect vulnerable groups: 
“[w]hether the supplier has knowingly taken advantage of the inability of 
the consumer reasonably to protect his interests because of his physical or 
mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy, or inability to understand the 
language of an agreement.”215 
Commentators have acknowledged that “[u]nconscionability as a remedy 
for the elderly has its own limitations.”216  Nonetheless, attempts to 
introduce the Discover Bank decision as persuasive authority in other 
jurisdictions have been encouraged.217  Unconscionability and other 
contract doctrines provide a rare opportunity—in a post-Marquette world 
dominated by federal regulation and the exportation doctrine—for states to 
hold lenders accountable.  Other states could adopt an unconscionability 
statute similar to that of Ohio, requiring judges to consider the vulnerability 
of an elderly consumer when evaluating a credit card contract.  Robust 
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application of consumer-friendly contract statutes would contribute to 
creating a safer world for elderly credit card consumers. 
VII. Conclusion 
For elderly credit card consumers, it is time to move beyond the 
historically limited disclosure requirements of TILA and to strengthen and 
expand the Credit CARD Act’s tentative steps toward substantive 
protections.  While substantial regulation of the credit card industry will 
require a balancing of interests, Congress would do well to give more 
weight to the interests of elderly consumers than to those of the credit card 
industry.  Until Congress acts, however, consumer advocates must remain 
active in their efforts for reform and work to ensure that elderly credit card 
consumers enjoy the best protections that existing law has to offer.  A 
consumer credit protection statute of real substance might be a rarity, but it 
is a necessity.   
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